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Animalism, the thesis that each of us is a human animal, is a prominent materialist 
account of what we are. Animalism is often motivated by an attractive line of 
reasoning, the Thinking Animal Argument. And, independently, animalism has been 
challenged by appeals to a metaphysical puzzle, the problem of the many. In this paper, 
I draw attention to the relationship between the Thinking Animal Argument and the 
problem of the many. I further argue that in virtue of this relationship, animalists are 
left in an unfortunate position: animalists cannot hold onto their most successful 




1  Introduction  
Kelly sits in a chair at her kitchen table, drinking a cup of coffee. She thinks about how much she 
hates mornings and how much she loves coffee. Looking up, she sees an animal in the mirror, but she 
has no guests and no pets. She’s alone in her kitchen, alone with her thoughts. When she sees the 
reflection of the human animal sitting in her chair, holding her cup of coffee, she appears to see herself. 
These are familiar experiences and familiar items, we see many of them in our own kitchens when we 
sit at our tables, drinking coffee, and hating mornings.  
 
Let’s focus on Kelly and try to determine what kind of being she is. Kelly is a thinking thing, a coffee-
drinker, and a morning-hater. She is the only thinking thing sitting in her chair drinking coffee and 
hating mornings. There is also an animal sitting in Kelly’s chair, a human animal – a member of the 
species Homo sapiens – with a functioning nervous system, digestive system, and brain. If so, it is 
completely ordinary to hold that this human animal sitting in Kelly’s chair is a thinking thing. After 
all, we ordinarily believe that human animals with functioning brains are thinking. If Kelly is sitting in 
her chair, thinking, and there is a human animal sitting in her chair, thinking, then the natural 
conclusion is that Kelly is the very coffee-drinking, morning-hating human animal sitting in her chair. 
It would be completely bizarre if there were more than one coffee-drinking morning-hater in Kelly’s 
chair; surely there aren’t two of those there. In the interest of preserving the judgment that there is a 
single thinker in Kelly’s chair, we are prompted to conclude that Kelly is numerically identical to the 
very human animal she sees in the mirror.  
 
Those who accept this conclusion endorse animalism, the view that each of us is a human animal. 
Animalism is motivated by the reasoning we just saw: animals are thinking things, we are thinking 
things, we don’t find two thinkers for every human animal, so we, including Kelly, must be those 
animals. We find this reasoning in the so-called Thinking Animal Argument (TAA). Such an argument 
strikes us as attractive and plausible; its premises seem obvious. The (TAA), attractive though it may 
seem, is weakened when we consider the implications of a notorious puzzle in metaphysics: the problem 
of the many. Animalists do not uniquely bear the burden of trying to respond to the problem of the 
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many, but the animalists’ burden is especially weighty, for they must not only resolve the problem but 
also retain motivation for animalism itself. In this paper I will demonstrate that the problem of the 
many requires animalists to make concessions that undermine the defense of their account. 
Specifically, I will advance a dilemma that leaves the animalist in an unfortunate position: either 
animalism cannot be motivated by its most successful argument, or animalism is false.  
 
Now much has been said about both the problem of the many as a general metaphysical puzzle and 
its implications for personal ontological accounts. And much, too, has been said about the Thinking 
Animal Argument. What has not been sufficiently addressed is the nature of the relationship between 
the puzzle and the argument. As I will argue, the puzzle poses a unique threat for animalists who 
appeal to the (TAA). Although the problem of the many appears to threaten all materialist ontologies, 
its threat to animalism targets not only the animalist ontology but also the motivation for animalism 
itself. As a result, my argument likewise targets this motivation. Animalists must solve the problem of 
the many with an eye to how the solution affects the (TAA), and some solutions come at the expense 
of their best argument. In order to simultaneously resolve the puzzle and motivate their view, 
animalists might need to look elsewhere for an argument for animalism.  
 
In §2 and §3, I show how the problem of the many threatens animalism and what the animalist must 
do to solve the puzzle. I will present the dilemma for the animalist in §4; if the animalist embraces a 
promising solution, then either animalism is false or its motivation is question begging. But without a 
solution, the animalist can no longer appeal to the most successful argument for animalism: the (TAA). 
While this does not suffice to show that animalism is false, it demonstrates the tension between 
responding to the problem of the many and defending the (TAA). In light of the problem of the many, 
animalists must either concede their thesis or give up reliance on the attractive Thinking Animal 
Argument.  
 
2  The Thinking Animal Argument and the Problem of the Many  
Animalists often rely on the Thinking Animal Argument to motivate the claim that we are human 
animals. Here’s how it goes for Kelly, although we can reinstate it for any of us:  
(TAA 1) There is a human animal sitting in Kelly’s chair.  
(TAA 2) Kelly is the only thinking being sitting in her chair.  
(TAA 3) The human animal sitting in her chair is thinking.  
(TAA 4) Hence, Kelly is that animal.1 
Animalists appeal to this argument because it seems so compelling. It certainly seems to be the case 
that there is a human animal in Kelly’s chair. Further, it is easy to accept that Kelly is sitting in her 
chair, thinking, and nothing else in her chair is thinking. Plausibly, the thinker in her chair is the human 
animal. Animals certainly seem like the kinds of things that think; they have functioning brains. 
Together these entail that Kelly is the very human animal sitting in her chair. The argument is intended 
to generalize, resulting in the view that each of us is a human animal. While the argument is compelling, 
the truth of the second premise relies on the uniqueness of the thinker in question: Kelly, and Kelly 
alone, is the thinking being sitting in her chair. This seems utterly ordinary, but accepting the thinker’s 
uniqueness depends on ruling out any thinker-candidates in Kelly’s vicinity, which in turn will depend 
on a solution to the problem of the many.2  
 
1 Cf. Olson (2009).  
2 One instantiation of the problem of the many takes the form of the thinking parts problem; see Lowe (2001), Olson 
(2007, §9.3), and Parfit (2012). I instead focus more broadly on the general problem of the many and proposed 
solutions, including the proposed solution to the thinking parts problem, eliminativism. 
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The problem of the many poses a threat to the animalist ontology, but it also threatens the very 
motivation for animalism.3 Consider Kelly’s table in highlighting the problem: Kelly’s table, if it exists 
at all, is a material object, whose parts plausibly include wood, screws, and varnish. At a more basic 
level, these parts are composed of some atoms. Call the plurality of atoms that compose the object 
made of the wood, screws, and varnish, ‘p
1
’. Then consider an object composed of all the atoms of p
1 
minus a single atom. Call the plurality of atoms that compose this object, ‘p
2
’. The object composed 
of p
2 seems equally qualified as the object composed of p1 to be a table. Objects composed of millions 
of other similar pluralities also seem to have what it takes to compose tables. It would be arbitrary to 
identify only one of these candidates but none of the others as a table. The problem of the many 
arises: either there are millions of tables in Kelly’s kitchen, or there are none.4  
 
We can likewise instantiate the problem for Kelly. If Kelly is a human animal, then she is composed 
of some plurality of atoms. And there will be many other pluralities of atoms, differing by single atoms, 
that also plausibly compose human animals. Call two such pluralities ‘k1’ and ‘k2’; call the object 
composed of k1, ‘Kelly-plus’ and the object composed of k2, ‘Kelly-minus’. Since these, and many 
other, pluralities seem equally qualified to compose thinking human animals, we should conclude that 
both Kelly-plus and Kelly-minus are thinking human animals, along with many others. The animalist 
cannot accept that none is a thinking human animal, and both Kelly-plus and Kelly-minus are equally 
good thinking animal candidates. Instead, given the problem of the many, it seems that there are many 
thinkers in Kelly’s chair.  
 
2.1  Responding to the Problem  
In order to continue to appeal to the (TAA), the animalist must find a way to maintain the truth of 
the second premise by solving the problem of the many. There are three ways to respond to the 
problem. First, one might embrace the multitude of objects and accept that there are, for instance, 
millions of tables where we ordinarily take there to be just one.5 Even if this works for tables, the 
animalist cannot accept that there are millions of thinking animals where we take there to be just one. 
Second, one might argue that there are no such objects, for instance, no tables in Kelly’s kitchen. This 
response is consistent with eliminativism, according to which there are far fewer material objects than 
we ordinarily take there to be.6 But the animalist will not go so far as to eliminate animals, so eliminating 
the offending objects will not solve the problem for Kelly. Instead, let us consider the third option.  
 
One might take the third option and defend the claim that just one plurality compose the object in 
question, be it Kelly’s table or a human animal. The animalist must do this successfully in order to 
defend (TAA 2), perhaps by endorsing the epistemic response or supervaluationism. The epistemic 
response involves maintaining that one, and only one, plurality of atoms in her kitchen compose a 
table, even if we don’t know which.7 None of the other, nearly identical, pluralities compose a table. 
 
3 For initial presentation, see Unger (1980). For discussion and purported solutions, see, e.g., van Inwagen (1990, Ch. 
17), Lewis (1993), Lowe (1995), Markosian (1998), and McGee and McLaughlin (2000). For its application with respect 
to persons and/or thinkers, see, e.g., Hudson (2001, esp. Ch. 1, 4), Unger (2004), Olson (2004, 2016) and (2007, §9.3), 
Hershenov (2013), Sutton (2014b), and Yang (2015).  
4 I’ve highlighted the problem as it arises for tables, but it applies to composite material objects in general.  
5 For examples of those who would defend such a response, see e.g., Kim (1976, §3), Chisholm (1976, §3.4), Lewis 
(1993), Unger (2004, 203), and Williams (2006). For the difficulties of specifying conditions of composition, see van 
Inwagen (1990, Ch. 2). 
6 For varieties of eliminativism, see van Inwagen (1990) and Merricks (2001). 
7 This would follow Williamson’s framework, labeled ‘epistemicism’ (1994). 
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We don’t know which one composes the table, but it is not in virtue of there being no fact of the 
matter. Rather, if this strategy is correct, there is a fact of the matter as to which plurality compose the 
table, but we don’t know which. If correct, there would not be millions of tables in Kelly’s kitchen, 
nor would there be none. There would be exactly one. None of the other, nearly identical, pluralities 
compose a table.  
 
A similar solution can be found in supervaluationism. The supervaluationist assessment of Kelly’s 
table is as follows: there are many admissible ways of precisifying our word ‘table’, and each of these 
ways will apply to a single table-candidate. So, the precise meaning of ‘table’ under one precisification 
will apply to, for instance, the object composed of p1 but no other object. The precise meaning of 
‘table’ under a different precisification will apply to, for instance, the object composed of p2 but no 
other object. On every admissible precisification of ‘table’, ‘There is one table in Kelly’s kitchen’ will 
be true according to the supervaluationist; therefore it is true simpliciter that there is one table in Kelly’s 
kitchen. Neither the epistemic nor supervaluationist response, then, requires accepting that there are 
millions of tables in her kitchen, or that there are none; there is exactly one. These strategies have been 
used to solve the problem for objects like tables. We will see, however, that they cannot be used to 
solve the problem for Kelly.  
 
If either the epistemic response or supervaluationism is correct, then ‘there is one thinker in Kelly’s 
chair’ is true. But consider the following case that illustrates the problem with these responses. 
According to the defenders of the epistemic response and supervaluationism, Kelly and Kelly-minus 
(whose composition differs from Kelly’s by a single atom, say, on the toe) are not both thinkers. 
Suppose Kelly goes to the eye doctor, sees a blurry vision chart, and reports ‘I think I need glasses’. 
At the same time, Kelly-minus likewise goes to the eye doctor, sees a blurry vision chart, and reports 
‘I think I need glasses’. Kelly and Kelly-minus will both be in representational states that have mental 
content. And they have the same brain and sense organs, so given the same external stimuli, Kelly’s 
contentful state will be an intrinsic duplicate of Kelly-minus’ contentful state. A difference of one 
single atom will not make any difference to the mental contents. It’s bad enough, then, that we have 
two different subjects with a duplicated contentful state even if they are not both thinkers. 
 
Even further, suppose we find a qualitative duplicate of Kelly-minus, call her Kelly-minus*. She is 
exactly like Kelly-minus, except she and Kelly are not overlapping at all. Kelly and Kelly-minus* both 
go to the eye doctor and report ‘I think I need glasses’. They sit in an otherwise-empty waiting room 
while the doctor writes up their prescriptions. If the eye doctor says to her assistant, ‘Both women 
think they need glasses’, what she says is true. Even the supervaluationist and the defender of the 
epistemic response should grant this. In ordinary circumstances if we see two women sitting in a 
waiting room, we would speak correctly in saying, ‘there are two thinkers in the waiting room’. So, on 
any admissible precisification of ‘thinker’, ‘Both women think they need glasses’ is true.  
 
Suppose we find a precisification according to which ‘Kelly thinks she needs glasses’ is true but ‘Kelly-
minus* thinks she needs glasses’ is false. This will then not be a precisification on which ‘both women 
think they need glasses’ is true. So, any precisification on which ‘Kelly thinks she needs glasses’ is true 
but ‘Kelly-minus* thinks she needs glasses’ is false will be inadmissible. Likewise, if we find a 
precisification according to which ‘Kelly thinks she needs glasses’ comes out false but ‘Kelly-minus* 
thinks she needs glasses’ comes out true, then ‘both women think they need glasses’ would be false. 
Any such precisification will be inadmissible as well. We likewise should not count as admissible any 
precisification on which both ‘Kelly thinks she needs glasses’ and ‘Kelly-minus* thinks she needs 
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glasses’ are false, for ‘both women think they need glasses’ would be false on this precisification, too. 
So, any admissible precisification, one on which ‘both women think they need glasses’ is true, will be 
a precisification on which both ‘Kelly thinks she needs glasses’ is true and ‘Kelly-minus* thinks she 
needs glasses’ is true. The defender of the epistemic response should also accept the truth of both 
statements.  
 
If this is so, then ‘Kelly-minus* is a thinker’ is true if and only if ‘Kelly is a thinker’ is true. And since 
Kelly-minus* is an exact duplicate of Kelly-minus, then we should hold that ‘Kelly-minus* is a thinker’ 
is true if and only if ‘Kelly-minus is a thinker’ is true. Therefore, if the supervaluationist and the 
defender of the epistemic response want to grant that ‘Kelly is a thinker’ is true, they must grant that 
‘Kelly-minus is a thinker’ is true also. This is a problem of too many thinkers. Supervaluationism and 
the epistemic response, then, fail to solve the problem of the many as it arises for thinkers. The 
animalist cannot use either to distinguish between many thinker-candidates and secure (TAA 2).  
 
Pointing out that animalists require a solution to the problem of the many is not a new observation. 
But if animalists continue to use to their favored argument, then animalists must find a solution that 
accords with the appeal of the (TAA). The success of arguments for other ontologies, those that do 
not have a premise like (TAA 2), does not rely on the success of any particular solution to the problem 
of the many. But because the (TAA) relies on the uniqueness of the thinker in question, this 
uniqueness must already be established in order to defend the argument. As I will argue in §4, since 
the (TAA) serves as the primary motivation for animalism, its failure would be quite consequential. In 
light of the problem of the many, successfully motivating animalism with the (TAA) will require 
successfully motivating some other solution. Discussion of another possible solution highlights the 
dilemma for the animalist – if the animalist makes use of this solution as initially wielded, then 
animalism is false. If the animalist does not make use of this solution, then animalism cannot be 
motivated by its most successful argument.  
 
3  The Elimination Principle: A Solution? 
A solution to the problem of the many will yield the result that only a single thinker-candidate in 
Kelly’s chair is Kelly. Since supervaluationism and the epistemic response do not solve the problem, 
we might instead appeal to an elimination principle. Concerning objects of some kind k, then  
Elimination Principle (EP): If there are many k-candidates and x is the k-candidate that has no 
superfluous parts, then x is an object of kind k and no other candidate is.8  
Superfluous parts are those parts which do not contribute to x’s characteristic profile, where  
Characteristic Profile Principle (CP): For any property, p, p is part of x ’s characteristic  
profile just in case x would cease to be a member of x’s primary kind if x ceases 
to have p.  
Consider again Kelly’s kitchen table, for illustration. Call the object composed of p1 ‘Table-Plus’ and 
the object composed of p2 ‘Table-Minus’. By applying the elimination principle (EP), if Table-Plus is 
a table-candidate and Table-Plus has superfluous parts, then Table-Plus is not a table. An ink-stain 
that plays no role in making the object a table, for instance, would be a superfluous part. So, if Table-
Minus is a table-candidate without an ink-stain and Table-Plus is a table-candidate with an ink-stain, 
then using an elimination principle yields that Table-Plus is not a table because it has superfluous 
parts. If all of Table-Minus’ parts play a contributory role in the table’s characteristic profile, then 
 
8 Cf. Hudson (2007, 218). 
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Table-Minus is a table. The appeal to (EP) and the idea of a characteristic profile thus allows us to 
distinguish among the candidates and conclude that there is just a single table in Kelly’s kitchen.  
 
Use of the elimination principle might seem promising, but using (EP) will undermine the very case 
that the animalist is trying to make. If we apply (EP) to thinkers, like Kelly, then an application of 
(EP) would be:  
(EPKelly): If there are many thinker-candidates and x is the thinker-candidate that has no 
superfluous parts, then x is a thinker and no other candidate is.  
 
Since Kelly is the x in question, it is natural to apply (CP): 
(CPKelly): For any property, p, p is part of Kelly’s characteristic profile just in case Kelly  
would cease to be a thinker if she ceases to have p.  
Kelly, then, by (EPKelly) and (CPKelly) is essentially a thinker, and parts that play no contributory role 
in her ability to think are superfluous parts. Her brain, for instance, is not a superfluous part; it plays 
a contributory role in her ability to think. But arbitrary skin cells, for instance, don’t, so they are 
superfluous. The best candidate for being Kelly would not be an animal, then, contrary to the 
animalist’s thesis.9 The human animal sitting in her chair has parts that play no contributory role in 
her characteristic profile – parts play no role in thinking. By (EPKelly) and (CPKelly), she is instead a 
material object that has at least the brain as a part but not parts like arms or legs. Since the animal has 
parts that are superfluous to the thinker, if we appeal to this elimination principle and characteristic 
profile principle, we will not get the result that the animalist wants – that Kelly is the very animal in 
her chair.10  
 
Since (EPKelly) and (CPKelly ) together yield the falsity of animalism, this initially-promising solution 
is unavailable to the animalist. Now some animalists will certainly reject (CPKelly) because they will 
not grant that Kelly is essentially a thinker.11 Some accept that Kelly could continue to exist even if 
she has no mental life whatsoever. This objection from the animalist will be addressed in §4.1, but for 
now I will simply note that while animalism itself does not require that we have the ability to think 
essentially, the motivation for the (TAA) depends on our self-identification as thinkers to get off the 
ground. And, since many thought experiments are designed to reveal that we think the person goes 
with the mental life, e.g. Locke’s thought experiment of the Prince and the Cobbler, I suggest that it 
is more natural to use (CPKelly) as a claim about Kelly as a thinker rather than some other primary 
kind.12 By this natural application of (EPKelly) and (CPKelly), then, animalism is false. This highlights 
the dilemma for the animalist: if the animalist makes use of (EP), then animalism is false and, as I will 
further argue, if the animalist does not make use of (EP), then animalism cannot be motivated by its 
most successful argument.  
 
3.1  The Viability of the Elimination Principle  
 
9 This is Hudson’s point, applied to our case (2007).  
10 Licon, however, accepts that each of us is identical to a human brain in a defense of ‘neural animalism’. Licon’s 
version of “animalism,” then, is not likewise, although it highlights that we, strictly speaking, are not animals on this 
view. We are instead, according to Licon, brains that have human animals associated with us (2013, esp. p. 68).  
11 Animalists who accept biological persistence conditions will do so; see Olson (1997) and van Inwagen (1990, §16). 
Others discuss the possibility psychological persistence conditions; see Sharpe (2015), Madden (2016), and Bailey (2017). 
Still others will deny that there are any criteria of persistence at all; see Merricks (1998). For discussion of varieties of 
animalism, see Bailey (2015) and Thornton (2016).  
12 For the Prince and the Cobbler case, see Locke (1979, II.xvii). 
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The animalist cannot avail herself of (EPKelly) and (CPKelly) to avoid the problem of the many since 
their use requires a rejection of animalism. But some have proposed that we should reject principles 
like (EP) because of their apparent failure in other cases. An elimination principle like (EP) might give 
us the wrong results when we apply it to, for instance, books.13 
 
Suppose you look on your bookshelf, and you wonder how many books you have. You might look at 
some titles and see things like ‘Material Beings’, ‘Crime and Punishment’, and ‘Calvin and Hobbes’. You have 
at least three books. If you pick up only your copy of Crime and Punishment, then you’re holding one 
book. Now you might want to know what parts the book has, what its dimensions are, etc. There are 
many book-candidates that might be the referent of ‘Crime and Punishment’.14 There are (at least) four 
options:  
1. Something composed of all the pages and the binding and the dustjacket (intuitively, what we 
call ‘book’).  
2. Something composed of all the pages (including the blank ones).  
3. Something composed of just the pages with writing on them.  
4. Something composed of just the page-parts with writing on them (intuitively,  
something composed of just the pages with writing on them, minus their margins).15  
In order to identify which of the candidates is Crime and Punishment, we might use an elimination 
principle: if x is the Crime and Punishment-candidate that has no superfluous parts, then x is Crime and 
Punishment and no other candidate is. The purpose of books is, arguably, to bear information. In this 
case, then, for some property, p, p is part of Crime and Punishment’s characteristic profile just in case 
Crime and Punishment would cease to be a book if p is lost. For books, including Crime and Punishment, 
when p is the property of bearing information, p is part of the book’s characteristic profile. Once we 
apply the elimination principle to books, we conclude that only candidate 4 is a book, since it 
accomplishes what books accomplish – bearing information – with the fewest parts. This application 
demonstrates that we should consider things like bindings and blank pages to be superfluous parts 
that play no contributory role in the information-bearing of the book.  
 
But now we’ve gotten the wrong answer. It is important for being a book that the book bears 
information, but this case seems to demonstrate that it would be a mistake to think that the smallest 
book-candidate that gets the job done is Crime and Punishment. In this case, we (apparently mistakenly) 
assumed that if some property (information-bearing) is characteristic of books, then all of the parts of 
a book must play some contributory role in the information-bearing of the book. If this application 
of (EP) and (CP) yields the wrong results in this case, that is, if it entails that candidate 4 and not 
candidate 1 really is Crime and Punishment, then we have reason to be skeptical about the success of 
elimination principles. For it seems as if using elimination principles commits us to the false conclusion 
that things that have bindings and pages with margins are not books. Perhaps we’re getting the wrong 
answer with respect to which thinker-candidate is really Kelly as well when we appeal to (EPKelly) and 
(CPKelly). 
 
3.2  Can we save (EP)?  
In order to threaten animalism, the conjunction of an elimination principle and a characteristic profile 
principle must both be plausible and entail the falsity of animalism. The book case suggests that the 
 
13 This example Bailey’s (2014a).  
14 Setting aside worries related to literary ontology, take ‘Crime and Punishment’ to refer to your copy of Crime and Punishment 
hereafter.  
15 See Bailey (2014a, 479).  
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elimination principle we’re working with is not plausible. A defender of (EP) might offer suggestions 
as to how we can fortify the principle so it entails that candidate 1 is Crime and Punishment. She 
might pursue one of two options:  
Option (i): reject that a book’s characteristic profile includes only bearing information, or 
Option (ii): argue that none of candidate 1’s parts are superfluous to bearing information.  
To pursue option (i), the defender of (EP) might suggest that bearing information is just part of what 
a book does. Books not only bear information but bear information in a certain format; books 
characteristically split information across multiple pages. Books characteristically contain these pages 
in a stable construction, complete with a binding. If we ripped out all the pages of Crime and Punishment, 
cut off all the white space, taped it back together, and rolled it up like a scroll, we no longer have a 
book, although we have all the information contained within Crime and Punishment. We would be 
missing some of the book’s characteristic profile: bearing information in a certain format. More work 
would need to be done in order to specify exactly what that format is, but the case illustrates that it is 
not merely bearing information. Candidate 1, but not the other candidates, one might argue, is the 
only candidate that bears information in that particular format, so candidate 1 really is Crime and 
Punishment.  
 
Or to pursue option (ii), the defender of (EP) might suggest that just bearing information is a book’s 
sole characteristic feature. But, one might argue, things like blank pages and bindings contribute to 
the bearing of information. The blank pages situate the information relative to other pages and the 
cover. The binding contributes to the information maintaining its order. Absent these features, the 
book would not bear the information in the same way, so these so-called “superfluous” parts are not 
so superfluous. Pursuing option (ii) likewise allows us to both apply (EP) and maintain that candidate 
1 is Crime and Punishment.  
 
The options should give us pause before rejecting (EP) altogether. And recall that (EP) is supposed 
to rescue us from the threat of the problem of the many. Employing (EP) allows us to give a principled 
reason for thinking that there is a single best candidate for being the thinker in Kelly’s chair, and it is 
false that there are either millions of objects equally qualified, or no object qualified, to be her. This at 
least gives us some reason to think we should keep (EP) around. We should now evaluate whether the 
animalist could use (EP) for her own purposes and ask what is at stake for the animalist if she abandons 
elimination principles altogether.  
 
4  The Dilemma  
If (EPKelly) and (CPKelly) are true, then animalism is false. The animalist can then pursue two routes 
forward: offer an alternative application of (EP) or reject use of (EP) altogether. As I will argue, 
alternative applications of (EP) can be defended only by begging the question. Rejecting use of (EP) 
altogether requires the animalist to let go of the commonsense appeal that the Thinking Animal 
Argument is supposed to have. Neither option leaves the animalist in a desirable position, for either 
animalism is false, or the (TAA) is unmotivated.  
 
4.1  Alternative Applications of (EP)  
Turning to the first horn of the dilemma, let us consider whether the animalist could repurpose (EP) 
and secure the desired result – that Kelly is an animal. Recall the strategies used in §3.2. In the books 
case, a defender of (EP) could either (i) reject that the characteristic profile of books includes only 
bearing information or (ii) argue that none of the intuitive candidate’s parts were superfluous to 
bearing information. The animalist might try to pursue analogous options to defend animalism. 
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Instead of endorsing (CPKelly), the animalist might take option (i) and reject the idea that her primary 
kind is thinker. The animalist might instead propose something like the following:  
(CPanimal): For any property, p, p is part of Kelly’s characteristic profile just in case Kelly would 
cease to be a human animal if she ceases to have p.  
Instead of appealing to thought as Kelly’s characteristic feature, the animalist might suggest that her 
essential properties are properties characteristic of human animals.16 Then (EPKelly) and (CPanimal) 
would not entail that the smallest material object that enables thought is Kelly, since many parts of 
the human animal play a contributory role in the characteristic profile of human animals even if they 
play no contributory role in thought.17  
 
This move allows the animalist to wield (EP) successfully, but it does not put the animalist in a 
favorable position in defending the (TAA). The (TAA) derives its force from the fact that we are 
thinkers, and this has such strong appeal because we conceive of ourselves as thinkers. When we 
conceive of ourselves as thinkers, we will assent to the truth of there being just one thinker in each of 
our chairs. The thinkers are us; we are the ones thinking our thoughts. And there cannot be more than 
one subject of our thoughts, and not many thinkers having qualitatively-identical thoughts. We must 
assent to these claims in order for the (TAA) to be successful, and the animalist relies on these self-
conceptions. But, at the same time, the animalist asks us to reject commonsense judgments about our 
own persistence. If we are essentially biological animals and not thinkers, then we do not follow our 
psychologies in Lockean thought experiments. We instead stay with our bodies. Commonsense 
judgments about our persistence prompt us to endorse not only (TAA 2) but would also incline us 
toward a principle like (CPKelly). 
 
The animalist, then, asks us to retain commonsense self-conceptions at a time in order to accept (TAA 
2) and reject commonsense judgments about our persistence through time in order to deny (CPKelly) in 
favor of (CPanimal).
18  The recipient may cling tightly to the fact that she is a thinker and look for 
resources to avoid the problem of the many. The animalist can provide only a question-begging 
application of (EP), according to which Kelly’s characteristic profile is the profile of a human animal 
and not a thinker.19 While those who already endorse animalism may be perfectly satisfied with such 
a solution, it is not likely to win any animalist converts. Since the success of the (TAA) relies on a 
solution to the problem of the many, the animalist cannot both appeal to the (TAA) as motivation for 
animalism and simultaneously maintain the truth of (TAA 2) by appealing to something like (CPanimal).  
 
Even with this modified (CP), however, animalism might still be false. It isn’t the case that every single 
part of the human animal, such as a single eyebrow hair, plays a contributory role in the characteristic 
profile. But eyebrow hairs are parts of human animals, so an application modified in this way gains 
the animalist little ground. Once someone has endorsed animalism, it is certainly a respectable move 
 
16 This might include properties like having a certain kind of DNA, being disposed to survive and reproduce, or keeping 
kin away from predators.  
17 Cf. Madden (2016) for another take on characteristic features and their relation to persistence.  
18 For critiques of animalists who try to retain self-conceptions both at a time and through time, see §4.3. 
19 Even if the animalist proposed that we are essentially living beings rather than human animals, its defense will be 
question-begging.  
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to propose something like (CPanimal). But this move does not provide the animalist with the tools 
required to motivate the (TAA) in light of the problem of the many.20  
 
Another strategy would be to endorse an eliminativist ontology according to which material  
objects like organisms exist but no other composite objects (like brains or arms) exist.21 If the only 
composite objects that exist are organisms, then, if thinkers are composite objects, then thinkers are 
organisms. Then both psychological and biological features would be part of Kelly’s characteristic 
profile. It has been argued that pursuing this strategy, too, requires the animalist to rely on question-
begging support.22 In addition, accepting eliminativism is often a consequence of other metaphysical 
and ontological commitments and is not useful evidence to use in motivating the ontology itself. Since 
the animalist is trying to convince us that we are animals, building in a controversial claim about classes 
of composite objects might give us reason to be hesitant about endorsing animalism, absent additional 
arguments in favor of these controversial claims. So, even if the animalist can use a different 
application of (EP), it comes at the expense of begging the question. And even if it solves the problem, 
it still requires giving up reliance on the Thinking Animal Argument.  
 
4.2 No Application of (EP)  
Let us consider the second horn of the dilemma. Without appealing to something like (EPKelly) and 
(CPKelly), the animalist cannot maintain (TAA 2), ‘Kelly is the only thinking being sitting in her chair’. 
(EPKelly) and (CPKelly) allowed us to exclude other objects from being thinker-candidates, avoiding 
the problem of too many thinkers. And while it certainly remains intuitive that Kelly is the only 
thinking being sitting in her chair, this is a claim that the animalist should not be permitted to appeal 
to unless it has already been established that Kelly is the human animal sitting in her chair and that the 
human animal is the only thinker. Once we’re made aware of the nearby candidates, we’re on unstable 
ground with respect to establishing the truth of (TAA 2). Absent an elimination principle, the only 
recourse an animalist has in response to the problem is question-begging. The animalist, then, can 
make claims like ‘the human animal sitting in Kelly’s chair is thinking’ but not ‘Kelly is the only 
thinking being sitting in her chair’ without assuming that Kelly is that very animal and also eliminating 
the other thinker-candidates.  
 
The animalist is in good company with defenders of other ontological accounts; the problem of too 
many thinkers does not uniquely threaten the animalist. The mere recognition that this problem arises 
does not demonstrate the falsity of animalism. But it does put the animalist in an unfortunate position 
with respect to motivating the view. Recall that the Thinking Animal Argument is supposed to have 
intuitive appeal. The argument seems so successful because it is just so easy to assent to the truth of 
the premises. If someone fairly new to personal ontology faces the (TAA), it is easy to be convinced 
that Kelly is identical to a human animal. But given that the animalist is aware of the problem of the 
many, this should threaten the defensibility of presenting the (TAA) as an intuitive, easy-to-accept 
 
20 Taking option (ii) involves accepting (CPKelly) and argue it entails that Kelly is an animal. The animalist would have to 
argue that no human animal part is superfluous to Kelly, and Kelly therefore is a human animal. This move is simply 
implausible, nor would it be pursued by those animalists who deny that we are essentially thinkers.  
21 For defenses of ontologies like this, see van Inwagen (1990, §9, §12) and Merricks (2001, Ch. 4). For its use by 
animalists, see Olson (2007, §9.5) and Yang (2015). For critique of this strategy as it relates to the (TAA), see 
Zimmerman (2008) and Watson (2016). For a reply to Zimmerman, see Olson (2008, 38-42).  
22 See Watson (2016).  
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argument. It would be disingenuous for the animalist to prompt someone to accept, for instance, 
(TAA 2) when the animalist knows that there are many other thinker-candidates around.  
 
The reasoning that would establish the truth of (TAA 2) would then have to be something like the 
following, utilizing a new premise (NP):  
(TAA 1) There is a human animal sitting in Kelly’s chair.  
(TAA 3) The human animal sitting in her chair is thinking.  
(TAA 4) Kelly is that animal.  
(NP) There is only one thinking being sitting in her chair. 
(TAA 2) Hence, Kelly is the only thinking being sitting in her chair.  
Now this may be a perfectly sound argument, and (NP) may help establish the truth of (TAA 2). But 
anyone who accepts this argument will already accept (TAA 4), the animalist thesis. So, in order to 
defend the (TAA), the animalist who does not want to appeal to (EP) requires some other strategy to 
establish that Kelly is the only thinking being in her chair. A neat way of doing that is by somehow 
making a case that organisms are the only things capable of thought.23 But unless someone has already 
granted that he is identical to an organism, he will not assent to it being the case that only organisms 
can think, for he is thinking but may not believe that he is an organism. In this case, (TAA) would fail 
because it is question-begging. Solutions, even if they don’t rely on (EP), might nonetheless depend 
on a commitment to animalism in order to solve the problem.  
 
So, perhaps the animalist instead proposes a solution from the other direction: we don’t need an 
elimination principle; we need a maximality principle. We can defend (TAA 2) and say that Kelly is 
the only thinking being in her chair if being a thinker is a maximal property.24 Likewise, the animalist 
could suggest that being an animal is a maximal property: for anything that is an animal, there is no 
large proper part of that thing that is itself an animal.25 If true, a maximality principle would provide 
the animalist with a method of distinguishing among many candidates and arriving at the conclusion 
that just one thing in Kelly’s chair, the animal, is a thinker.  
 
There are two problems with such a principle. First, in this case, we should resist the idea  
that a change entirely extrinsic to some entity results in a change to that entity’s primary kind – the 
kind of thing that entity is essentially.26 Plausibly, according to the animalist, our primary kind is animal, 
although the same problem will arise if our primary kind is thinker or person. So, in this case, consider 
Kelly and Kelly-minus, where Kelly has the property of being an animal according to the maximality 
principle and Kelly-minus is something composed of all the atoms that compose Kelly, minus a single 
atom, but does not have the property of being an animal. But if Kelly loses that single atom, then the 
thing composed of all the atoms that composed Kelly, minus that single atom, will come to be an 
animal. Kelly-minus, however, has undergone no change in this case but if being an animal is a 
maximal property, then Kelly-minus turns into an animal despite undergoing no intrinsic change. 
 
23 Animalists may give caveats allowing for the possibility that deities or angels may be capable of thought as well; cf. 
Olson (2009).  
24 Bailey defends the claim that being conscious is a maximal property (2014b, §3). I’ll speak in terms of being a thinker, 
but we would arrive at the same place if we speak in terms of being conscious. Yang also discusses a maximality 
response (2015, §2). For discussion of maximality about other kinds of things, see Sider (2001).  
25 One might speak of parts that are “caught up in a life”; cf. van Inwagen (1990, esp. §17), or appeal to a hylomorphic 
account according to which only the maximal object has a substantial form; cf. Toner (2011, 2012).  
26 Cf. Johnston (2007) and Johnston (2016).  
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Before Kelly loses that single atom, Kelly-minus is some object but not an animal. Once Kelly loses 
that single atom, Kelly-minus becomes an animal, despite no intrinsic change.27  
 
The animalist might argue that Kelly-minus does not exist at all, and so it is false to say that Kelly-
minus changes into an animal from a non-animal at some extrinsic change. Rather, if this is the case, 
the parts that we described as Kelly-minus’ go from composing nothing to composing something at 
Kelly’s loss of a single atom. This raises the second problem with the maximality principle as used by 
the animalist. In order to defend the claim that there is no such object as Kelly-minus, the animalist 
must argue that being a composite material object is a maximal property in general. For the animalist 
must secure the result that only the maximal candidate, Kelly, has the property of being a composite 
material object and no other nearby candidate does. In order to do this, the animalist would need 
some principle that prohibits composite objects from having large proper parts at all.  
 
This, as a general principle, is false. Many things have the non-maximal property of being  
a composite material object.28 A tile, for instance, can have another tile as a large proper part. So, even 
if Kelly-minus is not an animal, Kelly-minus might be some other kind of object. If Kelly has the 
property of being a composite object, then we should think that Kelly-minus has the property of being 
a composite object as well. And if Kelly-minus is an object, then some change, presence or absence 
of some atom, entirely extrinsic to Kelly-minus will affect whether Kelly-minus is an animal. Unless 
the animalist can either demonstrate that being an object is a maximal property or defend the idea that 
some object can turn into an animal despite undergoing no intrinsic change, then appealing to a 
maximality principle will not provide a solution to the problem of the many, either.  
 
The animalist, then, cannot appeal to supervaluationism or an epistemic response to the problem of 
the many, as we saw in §2.1. Nor can the animalist make use of elimination principles or maximality 
principles. While these are not the only possible responses to the problem of the many, they represent 
the popular responses to the puzzle in this context. In the absence of these options, the animalist must 
then find some other solution to the problem of the many. Pointing out that animalists require a 
solution is not a new observation. But, crucially, in light of the foregoing discussion, if animalists are 
to continue to appeal to the favored argument, then the animalist must find a solution that accords 
with the intuitive, commonsense appeal of the (TAA) and does not rely on the truth of animalism for 
its success. The success of arguments for other views, those that do not rely on a premise like (TAA 
2), then, does not rely on the success of any particular solution to the problem of the many. Because 
the (TAA) relies on the uniqueness of the thinker in question, this uniqueness must already be 
established in order to defend the argument. In light of the problem of the many, establishing the 
uniqueness of the thinker will come at a counterintuitive cost, and successfully motivating animalism 
with the (TAA) will require successfully motivating some other solution to the problem of the many.  
 
4.3  Giving up the Thinking Animal Argument  
Despite its attraction, there are well-known problems with animalism, including its apparent 
implications regarding our persistence. If Kelly’s cerebrum is transplanted into a taller body, then, 
intuitively, Kelly is the taller animal with her old cerebrum, but animalism seems to accord most 
 
27 The same problem arises if we’re speaking of Kelly as a thinker or as a person. It is implausible that Kelly-minus 
would come to be a thinker or a person despite no intrinsic change.  
28 See Sutton (2014a).  
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naturally with the claim that she is the cerebrum-less animal lying on the operating table.29 A view that 
entails that we do not follow our cerebra in transplant cases is a profoundly counterintuitive view of 
what we are. Yet some animalists accept such a view and its counterintuitive commitments.30 
 
The Thinking Animal Argument provided strong countervailing evidence that could  
override the commonsense intuitions in cerebrum transplant cases. But without the (TAA), these 
intuitions threaten to tip the balance strongly against the animalist. Now it is, in principle, open to the 
animalist to say that we do follow our cerebra in transplant cases.31 Call those who say so psychological 
animalists. Commonsense intuitions in cerebrum transplant cases, then, are no evidence against this 
form of animalism, and loss of the (TAA) is not devastating to the psychological animalist.  
 
But psychological animalists will have counterintuitive commitments of their own. While they do not 
say revisionary things about us, they will need to say revisionary things about animals. Psychological 
animalism requires a strange account of what it is to be the same animal over time. The psychological 
animalist says that Kelly is the very same animal as the pre-transplant animal, despite suddenly being 
taller and having new circulatory, digestive, and respiratory systems, along with other physical features 
beyond the cerebrum. And what should be said about the cerebrum-less animal that’s left behind? 
Since Kelly, the animal, went with her cerebrum, perhaps it is not an animal at all. But human animals 
that suffer brain damage do not cease to be animals, and the cerebrum-less entity is not importantly 
different than human animals whose cerebra have stopped working entirely. For the sake of 
consistency, the psychological animalist should maintain that the cerebrum-less entity is, indeed, an 
animal. So, perhaps it is an animal that has just come into existence.32 But, for the reasons we saw in 
§4.2, removal of something entirely extrinsic to that animal cannot effect its existence, so this move is 
implausible. Another option is to hold that that there have always been two animals, this cerebrum-
less animal and Kelly. But if both Kelly and the animal existed prior to the transplant, then we arrive 
back at the problem of the many.33 All of these options require concessions about what we ordinarily 
take animals to be. As a result, the psychological animalist trades in a profoundly counterintuitive view 
of what we are for a profoundly counterintuitive view of animals and their persistence.  
 
All animalists, then, are saddled with some counterintuitive commitments in cerebrum transplant 
cases. These commitments are not devastating if counterbalanced by the force of the (TAA). Without 
the (TAA), they constitute a much more serious problem that demands strong countervailing evidence. 
While there have been attempts to defend psychological animalism or provide alternatives to the 
(TAA), the foregoing discussion shows that much more rides on their success than previously thought. 
They are not merely auxiliary issues; they should now be the key focus in assessing the viability of 
animalism.  
 
4.4  Other Arguments for Animalism  
A successful argument for animalism must satisfy two desiderata. First, it cannot force the animalist 
onto the horns of the same dilemma that arises for the Thinking Animal Argument; it cannot be 
 
29 For other discussions of this kind of case, see, e.g., van Inwagen (1990), Merricks (2001, 52), Toner (2011, 2014, §4), 
and Licon (2012, 2013, 2014).  
30 This accords with endorsement of biological rather than psychological persistence conditions, see Olson (1997) and, 
for a critique, Dupré (2014).  
31 For this kind of response from the animalist, see Sharpe (2015), Madden (2016), and Bailey (2017, §10).  
32 Sharpe (2015) would make this move, despite its apparent implausibility. 
33 Nor should the psychological animalist hold that some cerebrum-less entity has just turned into an animal, for this, 
too, results in the problem of the many; cf. §4.2.  
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hostage to a successful resolution of the problem of the many. Second, it must provide strong 
countervailing evidence that can tip the balance toward animalism in light of cerebrum transplant 
cases. It needs to alleviate the worries that come with the animalists’ counterintuitive commitments in 
such cases.  
Some recent arguments for animalism will, like the (TAA), give rise to the very same dilemma 
in response to the problem of the many. Consider a Causal Argument for Animalism (CAA) as it arises 
for Kelly while she drinks her coffee:  
(CAA 1) Kelly causes the cup of coffee to move. 
(CAA 2) Kelly is the only entity that causes the cup of coffee to move. 
(CAA 3) The human animal in Kelly’s chair causes the cup of coffee to move.  
(CAA 4) Hence, Kelly is that human animal.34  
Arguments like the (CAA) rely on some feature or power that Kelly has uniquely and simultaneously 
shares with the human animal in her chair.35 To avoid redundant attribution of this feature or power, 
we’re prompted to conclude that Kelly and the human animal are one and the same. In order to 
motivate the uniqueness claims that factor in these arguments, we arrive at the very dilemma that must 
be avoided: animalists must either make use of some kind of elimination principle or find some other 
solution to the problem of the many. As a result, animalism is either false or cannot be motivated by 
the argument in question. So, these arguments fail to satisfy the first of the desiderata.  
 
Animalists must then rely on other arguments. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to take on 
every alternative, I’ll address two. Bailey argues that we have the very same interests as human animals, 
and we should favor animalism as a result.36 Blatti has argued that if we accept that we ourselves are 
products of evolution, we should accept animalism for its accordance with facts about our 
evolutionary history.37 Neither of these arguments relies on a uniqueness claim, so the first of the 
desiderata is met. Regarding the second, it is far from clear whether either argument constitutes the 
requisite strong case. As Bailey acknowledges, success of his argument depends on our having non-
biological persistence conditions. But this comes at profound cost to the animalist in the form of 
counterintuitive accounts of animals and their persistence. And Gillett argues that Blatti’s reasoning 
relies on a questionable claim about what kinds of entities can count as being evolutionary 
participants.38 In both cases, more discussion is needed to determine whether these arguments can 
provide the strong countervailing evidence that is required to motivate animalism. All things 
considered, it remains to be seen whether these or other arguments can be defended in a way that 
satisfies both desiderata.  
 
5  Conclusion  
So, it is challenging to determine what kind of being Kelly is, beyond a thinker. Animalists will insist 
that she is an organism, a human animal, to be precise, a view motivated by the Thinking Animal 
Argument. The (TAA) is supposed to be convincing, with premises that are easy to accept. Most 
importantly, we easily assent to the claim, ‘Kelly is the only thinker sitting in her chair’; what, other 
than Kelly, could be sitting in her chair and thinking? This seems obvious, and it relies on the fact that 
we conceive of ourselves as thinkers.  
 
34 Cf. Licon (2012). 
35 The (TAA) is one such argument; for others that have been proposed, see Merricks (2001, Ch.2 §IV and p. 86) and 
Licon (2012, 2013).  
36 See Bailey (2017). 
37 See Blatti (2012). 
38 See Gillett (2013). 
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The animalist appeals to this self-conception to demonstrate to us the truth of a premise in the 
argument. I have argued, however, that in order to fully motivate the argument, the animalist has to 
require us to simultaneously depend on this self-conception and reject it in deference to the animalist 
thesis. We must reject it because if we hold tightly onto our self-identification as thinkers, then we will 
not be able to both respond successfully to the problem of the many and maintain animalism – for 
being thinkers prompts us toward principles like (EPKelly) and (CPKelly), which entail the falsity of 
animalism. But once we reject our self-identification as thinkers, the Thinking Animal Argument 
becomes harder to accept.  
 
The difficulty arises in virtue of the implausible moves that are required in order to maintain that there 
is just a single thinker in Kelly’s chair, which we can see from the discussion of elimination principles. 
I have here shown that even repurposed elimination principles will not save the animalist, for they are 
plausible only once we’ve accepted animalism. As such, they cannot be used to motivate animalism. 
And other promising solutions to the problem of the many, like supervaluationism, an epistemic 
response, or maximality principles, will not be successful when applied to cases like Kelly’s.  
 
Without a good solution to the puzzle, the best argument for animalism, therefore, fails. As a result, 
the animalist must (i) provide a plausible elimination principle and understanding of characteristic 
profiles that neither requires a commitment to animalism nor entails the falsity of animalism, (ii) 
provide a non-question-begging solution to the problem of the many that accords with the intuitive 
appeal of the (TAA), or (iii) provide a more robust defense of other arguments for animalism. While 
alternative arguments are available, they have been complements to the Thinking Animal Argument, 
not replacements. And some of them depend on a uniqueness claim, similar to what we find in the 
(TAA), that cannot go presupposed in the absence of a solution to the problem of the many. The 
burden of motivating animalism, then, lies with a few recent arguments that need further examination 
or with new arguments that have yet to be proposed. Assessment of the relationship between the 
problem of the many and the Thinking Animal Argument, then, yields the result that animalism is 
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